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Can Science Be Enchanting?
Ways to a Phenomenology of Religion in the Post-Modern Age1
Sebastian Cöllen
1 Max Weber often spoke about the process of rationalization. This occurred not only in 
religion, where vital and unpredictable forms of religious life had been replaced by a 
systematized view of cosmos and of »the sacred« itself, culminating in the Protestant 
Ethic. Rationalization was also a common theme in the evolution of an increasingly 
impersonalized justice, even in the evolution of music. In his 1911 essay Rationale und 
soziale Grundlagen der Musik,2 Weber thought himself to be able to spot a deep difference
between the music of pre-modern »Man« and the modern (Western) way of composition, 
the latter being subjected to a set of calculable rules which reached their peak with the 
twelve-tone system, the ratio- nality of which even the most rebellious step—a move 
away from tonality—could negate, but never transcend to another order.
2 Science was a fundamental part of this slow but steady movement toward a »disenchanted 
world«. In Science as a Vocation (WEBER 1970; German Wissenschaft als Beruf, 1922), Weber 
speaks about feelings that the youth of his day held toward science. In an allusion to the 
cave metaphor of Plato’s Republic, Weber describes the unbridled enthusiasm of early 
science as the sun of Enlightenment  rose outside the dark walls of the mediaeval 
cavemen: how could one not have thought this light the sun of Plato’s eternal ideas; that 
science would be the new and safer way to God (WEBER 1970, p. 140)!
3 »Today«, Weber says,
»youth feels rather the reverse: the intellectual constructions of science constitute
an unreal realm of artificial abstractions, which with their bony hands seek to grasp
the blood-and-sap of true life without ever catching up with it.« (WEBER 1970, pp.
140 f.)
4 The youth of Weber’s day is probably no longer among us but these feelings toward 
science still hold true.
5 According to Weber, this simply has to be so. Science cannot tell us the »meaning« of the 
world. It cannot tell us how we could or should live. This stand has to be taken from 
another point, one that science should not attempt to cover  by  relapsing into 
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irrationalism or by promoting subjectivist views instead of relating objective facts (W
EBER 1970, p. 142-45, cf. p. 149 f.).
6 From this point of view, rationalization would seem to belong to the very essence of 
science and disenchantment would consequently appear to be the natural expression of 
its own self-realization. In an extraordinary way, this process actually seems to have 
taken place within one particular discipline of science  during the 20th century: the 
phenomenology of religion.
7 One of the most important  schools of this discipline—the one of the Dutch  scholar
Gerardus van der Leeuw—was  from the start highly interested in the  »meaning« of 
religious phenomena. Van der Leeuw’s phenomenological paradigm relied heavily upon a 
distinction between »explanation« and »interpretation« drawn from the hermeneutics of 
Wilhelm Dilthey. Although scholars like Jacques Waardenburg have recognized Dilthey’s 
influence on the young van der Leeuw as undisputable (WAARDENBURG 1997, p. 268), the 
impact of this dichotomy really has to be seen in a larger context, one in which »the call
for understanding (Verstehen)« pervaded such different fields of research as psychology, 
cultural  anthropology, and the philosophy of, for instance,  Max Scheler and Edmund 
Husserl (WAARDENBURG 1997, p. 268). This distress call was raised in a time when the 
humanities felt a strong need to defend their independence against the natural sciences. 
Dilthey, for one, claimed the unique nature of the Geisteswissenschaften, those sciences that
were able to »understand« the meaning of the creations of the human spirit (Geist), while 
the natural sciences could only »explain« them as natural objects (DILTHEY 1927). Within 
the study of religion,  this view was adopted by scholars like Brede Kristensen, who 
defended not only the humanities against the natural sciences, but also religion as an 
entity per se among the other humanities.
8 Gerardus van der Leeuw was one of Kristensen’s most outstanding pupils. In his magnum 
opus, Phänomenologie der Religion, he adopted several principles from the philosophical
phenomenology of Scheler and Husserl to develop a phenomenological method applicable
to the study of religions (V. D. LEEUW 19562).3 The goal of this study was to search for the 
essence of religious phenomena, or »ideal types« (Idealtypen), as they »appeared« to the 
scholar (cf. Gk phaínomai »to appear«). In themselves, however, these ideal types were 
eternal, situated in a realm outside historical time (V. D. LEEUW 19562, § 109, esp. pp. 771 
f.). Only  through  a process of classification, of activation (Einschaltung)  of the 
phenomenon in the scholar’s own life,4 through the unbiased observation of  the 
phenomenon (Epoché) in its present essence, and a clarification (Klärung) of  the 
experience through shutting out all that did not belong to the phenomenon’s »essence«, 
could the scholar see the ideal type of which the phenomenon was an example: that is, to 
obtain a total »understanding« of the phenomenon (V. D. LEEUW 19562, pp. 772–777).
9 But even if van der Leeuw’s phenomenological school was no doubt the most influential 
one between 1925 and 1950 (so SHARPE 19922, p. 229), it was not the only one. Already in 
1887, P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye’s Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte had been published. 
In a »phenomenological«  part, this work  dealt  with the classification of religious 
phenomena. In this earliest use of the term  »phenomenology  of  religion«, 
phenomenology was obviously not deemed a special theory, nor did Chantepie try to 
invoke a theory external to his work. In fact, when the phenomenological discussion was 
missing in the second edition of the Lehrbuch, it was probably due to the theoretical 
difficulties of this approach, which Chantepie felt would need a book of their own (S
HARPE  19922, p. 223).  Nevertheless, as a reaction against the somewhat »platonic«
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approach of van der  Leeuw’s phenomenological school and to other »sensitive« 
approaches to religion made in the footsteps of men such as Rudolf Otto and Nathan 
Söderblom,  Chantepie’s rather non-philosophical  conception of phenomenology of 
religion was to be called to life again.
10 Following World War II, principally in Scandinavia and the Netherlands,  a  second 
phenomenological  branch appeared within history of religion,5 sometimes  also 
considered the synchronic complement to the diachronic study of the history of religion.6
This branch was chiefly represented by scholars like the Swedes Geo Widengren and Åke 
Hultkrantz, who aimed at a purely descriptive approach. In an article about the aims and 
methods of phenomenology of religion, Hultkrantz made it clear that he saw van der 
Leeuw’s  phenomenology  as itself comprising  »an ›Einklammerung,‹  a parenthesis«, 
between Chantepie’s work and the common  attitude that began to emerge among 
Scandinavian and Italian researchers along  the lines of a strict positivist  science (H
ULTKRANTZ 1970, p. 73). Hultkrantz, for his part, defined phenomenology of religion as 
the
»systematic study of the forms of religion, that part of religious research which
classifies  and  systematically  investigates  religious  conceptions,  rites  and  myth-
traditions  from  comparative  morphologic-typological  points  of  view.«
(HULTKRANTZ 1970, pp. 74 f.)
11 According to Hultkrantz, »no specific intuitive quality« was needed to grasp the meaning 
of phenomena. Widengren even stated the »ideal goal« of phenom- enology of religion to 
be, not an »understanding« of specific cultural worlds, but a »general, overarching 
phenomenological monograph.«7
12 As a reaction against a basically essentialist and intuitive approach to religion, this stand 
is, I would say, fully understandable and, in its own way, even justified. But even if this 
approach constitutes a special »method«—a claim that can be criticized (cf. ALLEN 2005, 
p. 7086)—, the question is whether this activity, reaching neither for the »meaning« of 
phenomena, nor for an »explanation« of  them, could ever claim to have greater 
aspirations than the simple satisfaction of  the curious collector. Naturally,  such 
collections and categorizations of data are what make any knowledge possible; what is 
questioned is not the methodology behind them, but whether they could in themselves 
aspire to the epithet of  »knowledge«  and, thus, to the role they have within the 
typological approach of forming a purpose in themselves.
13 In the meantime, phenomenology of religion seems to have lost its footing. Stretching
across two branches which in reality seem to have very little in common except for their 
name, »phenomenology of religion« has become a term that lacks clear content. Being 
something like an entry-ticket into a »fashionable methodological circle« (RYBA 1991, p. 
xv. Cf. SPIEGELBERG 19782, p. 3), the concept has been adopted by a continuously growing
party of scholars, thus making it very hard to see wherein the »methodology« of this 
circle should really consist. At its  widest, most watered-down definition of 
»phenomenology of religion«, simply  denoting »an investigation  of any religious
phenomena« (ALLEN 2005, p. 7086),  even a scholar  within the field of psychology of 
religion could be termed a »phenomenologist«.
14 Perhaps because of this confused state, the quest for the historical origins of the wide 
spectrum of phenomenology of religion has been a frequent topic during recent decades,8 
as has the quest for the common traits of its actual branches. Gilhus, for instance, means 
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that what still unites the two extremes should be their  comparative,  systematizing
approach:
»The phenomenology of religion is, in both its branches, the comparative discipline
of the history of religions. It is this comparative character which makes it a special
discipline  […].  It  is  used  to  legitimize  the  claim  that  the  history  of  religions
constitutes a special science.« (GILHUS 1984, p. 31)
15 To me, this wide definition seems only a reflection of the general confusion, and one 
might ask how such a vague meaning could »legitimize the claim« of any science as a 
special discipline. If one follows the trend and goes back to the roots of phenomenology
as a concept in the world of Western science and culture, this becomes very clear. When 
the word was first introduced in German from French phénomène in the 18th century, it 
typically represented anything that appeared to the senses or, in a narrower sense, a ›
strange appearance‹ (J./W. GRIMM 1889). This usage would persist, adopted for instance 
by the natural sciences and employed e.g. in Newton’s writings (SPIEGELBERG 19782, p. 8).
This non- philosophical branch of phenomenology also coined the narrower sense in 
which the word was employed by John Robinson in his article about »Philosophy« in 
Encyclopædia Britannica of 1788. Here, the term designated that part of philosophy which 
merely described  and arranged  phenomena  from different  comparative contexts. 
Similarly, the polymath William Whewell (Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, 1847) used it 
with reference to that branch of certain »palaeontological [i. e., ›historical‹] sciences« 
which dealt with classification and  whose aim was to discover »natural classes« (S
PIEGELBERG 19782, p. 9). The word was still used about comparison, classification, and 
arrangement of facts in the diverse field of the natural sciences of the 19th and 20th 
centuries; and a quick browse through any library catalogue of biology, pharmacy, or 
physics will show this to be true for the 21st century, as well.
16 Thus, comparison can obviously  not be enough to characterize phenomenology  of 
religion as a methodologically  separate field. Any claim that we could be  without 
comparison actually reveals a lack of insight in what we do, because, as Thomas B. Lawson
(1996, p. 32) has said in respect to comparison, we do it all the time. The recognition of this 
fact probably underlies observations  such as  phenomenology of religion being a 
»method«, albeit used by several sciences (cf. BLEEKER 1959, p. 106), a statement which 
reveals an identification of phenomenology with comparison but also of comparison 
being a general trait of any science.
17 One answer to the methodologically dim and in part theoretically questioned condition of
phenomenology of religion has been to abandon the »phenomenological project« as a 
whole, as one of the many dead-ends of modernity. To an ex- tent, this has certainly
meant that the study of religion has been »rationalized« in the Weberian sense. Instead of
meaning, it asks for »hard facts«—or, to use Dilthey’s dichotomy, instead of trying to 
»understand« the Other, it seeks  to »explain« it. To take one example, the cultural-
historical school to which scholars like Bruce Lincoln could be counted no longer uses 
comparison to reconstruct »eternal essences« or »ideal types«, but to find out the laws 
governing the formation of a religious society (LINCOLN 1981).
18 To answer his question whether religions are similar, given similar cultures, Lincoln still 
uses comparison.9 But in the post-modern critique against phenomenology of religion,
even the method of comparison has been questioned. Timothy Fitzgerald, for instance, 
has termed the discipline of phenomenology of religion a »liberal ecumenical theology«, 
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its comparative concepts harboring from the start a  hidden ideological agenda from 
which we cannot rid ourselves (FITZGERALD 1997).
19 Where do we go from here? What is the role of cross-cultural comparison in the post-
modern age? Can science be enchanting? Or is disenchantment the necessary 
consequence of science being scientific?
20 As much as I agree with  Weber with  the point that science should not revert to 
subjectivism or the anti-empirical  tendencies that have been criticized  within  phe
nomenology of religion at least since the death of Gerardus van der Leeuw in
21 1950, I am reluctant to see this as a dead end. On the contrary, I think it could be
worthwhile to consider the possibilities of dealing scientifically with meaning, with the 
potential of science to expand beyond the bonds of rationalization. But then, a third way 
has to be found, one in which the quest for meaning does not involve the irrationalism of 
the »sensitive« way to understanding.
22 I would begin with questioning the very dichotomy that from the outset propounded this 
distinction between (subjective)  understanding and (objective)  explanation which has 
accompanied the search for meaning since the days of Dilthey. For Dilthey, the concept of
Verstehen was not viewed as a goal but as a process, involving feeling etc. I think this 
distinction has to be rejected from the start, because what we arrive at at the end of an 
investigation is always, hopefully, an »understanding« of the phenomena, no matter if we
see them as part of a natural order or an order of semantic meaning. And, conversely,
there can never  be a  scientific understanding lest it is preceded by explanation. 
»Explanation« literally means: to make plain, or clear. It always involves a disclosure of 
structures and relations that somehow exist in a given context. To »understand«  a
phenomenon is to have »explained« any structure in and through which it exists.
23 Admittedly, this is more or less what Weber’s »verstehende Soziologie« aimed at. But 
defining Sinn (meaning) as the intention of the acting subject (WEBER 19473, esp. § 1.I), 
this approach—like the modern hermeneutics of Betti or Hirsch —remains caught with a 
subject-dependent method (»ask the believer!«), which must end up either with an an 
infinite number of specific perspectives, or with abstracted generalizations, much like 
van der Leeuw’s Idealtypen. Furthermore, the possibility must be considered that there 
simply is no clearly definable subjective intention—and this is not the least the case when 
it comes to religious actions: in the solemn prayer, in the traditional ritual, during the 
ecstatic trance. And, even if there is one, any claim by the subject to be the authoritive 
interpreter can be seriously called into question. It is a familiar fact that one and the 
same person can look at her/his actions in completely different ways from different 
positions in her/his life: why would one of them be more true than the other—or, for that 
matter, more true than that of the detached observer? There is a certain metaphysics in 
this way of thinking, even if just the old metaphysics of the subject as the source of 
meaning and truth. But, precisely because we hardly notice it, this metaphysics—as a 
discourse, as a way of thinking—has been so hard to escape. To transcend this pattern of 
thought would seem to imply a turn away from the most obvious object of study for any
interpretive cultural science: the human being.
24 But is this not what the »explaining«  sciences have already done in turning to  the
natural, e.g. the economical or biological causes  of actions and behaviour patterns? 
Would this, therefore, be the »objective way to understanding« intended through the 
destruction of the  »understanding-explaining« dichotomy?  And, if  that is so, and if 
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»understanding« can still claim to escape rationalization, why does scientific explanation 
still seem to disenchant its objects? Wherein does this fatal spell of rationalization lie, and
how can we avoid it—if avoiding it is possible, at all?
25 To Weber, the intellectualization of the world, in which science is part, means that there 
are »principally no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that 
one can, in principle, master all things by calculation« (WEBER 1970, p. 139). What 
happens each time I start my car may be a mystery to me, but in principle, it is not one. 
»This means«, says Weber, »that the world is dis- enchanted.« Everything is predictable. 
Everything works after rules and structures that are long known, or could be known, if I 
only wished to learn them (WEBER 1970, p. 139). Or, to allude to a theme from Nietzsche 
(19665, p. 248), everything taught from the past is already well known from the present, 
and even trivial.
26 But it is doubtful whether familiarity or predictability would be disenchanting as such. A 
ritual of magic may be just as predictable as the proceedings of logic. The fact that we 
»understand« something or learn to »come to terms« with it does not mean that the 
phenomenon inevitably  becomes less captivating.  Rather, it a  question  of what we 
understand it as.
27 Here is the bifurcation where the traditionally »explaining« sciences and a hermeneutic 
phenomenology part and where the turn away from the subject as the traditional object 
of study to the work or act itself, may become productive. In actions, in language, in all the 
different kinds of cultural products that a society brings forth, relations between human 
beings and their world, their culturally situated being, come to expression and, thereby, 
into existence. As words, acts, things, they exist, and, as expressions, they speak. To listen
to this speech means not to listen to an underlying »essence« which now comes into 
existence: this dichotomy, too, needs to be transcended. Speaking is not primarily an
archetypal  pattern or an ahistorical structure, but the historically  situated human’s 
relation to his/her existence, human understanding of the bordering world. What exists 
is, so to speak, already in itself »essential«.
28 This world of human beings, which is also the world of their works of poetry, of their 
edifices, and of public decorative art, harbour structures that are only in part collectively 
readable: they may also be exclusive. The complex symbolism of an Iron Age bracteate 
might not have been understood by all, even if everyone could admire the value of the 
workmanship. To some, it would be a riddle. Dug up by an archaeologist one and a half 
millennia  later, the same piece of artistry is  understood simply  as a relic. If the 
archeologist is not also a historian of religions, his/her interpretations will be based on a 
completely different system of meaning, which cannot relate to, cannot »disclose« the 
world which, metaphorically speaking, lies hidden in the beaten metal.
29 Nevertheless, all of these ways of disclosing structures are »true«. This is not a matter of 
subjective relativism—what someone thinks that the object is—, but of asking what it is 
factically10 in the context-determined way in which it exists and in which we deal with it. 
What is important is that this particular »way«, this »how«, is in a significant way always 
dependent on the historical world within which it exists. Some of these worlds, however, 
will always be able to open up for a thing more possible ways in which it can be. The axe, 
for instance, could be used as a hammer, the temple as a mall; but neither would exploit 
the full possibilities of either object. Here lies the importance of regaining the original
world of a myth, a relic, a ritual object, of reconstructing its possible references: not 
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because this context will bring the only »true« meaning of the object of study,  but 
because it will probably render the richest one.
30 Hence the need for the scholar to be a good listener,  a good anthropologist,  a  good 
historian: only because of her/his knowledge of the culturally specific context might s/he
be able to disclose the structures of the different worlds centered upon a specific object of
study, preserving, thereby, the multivocality inherent in every cultural object, that is to 
say, its potential to mean different things to differently situated human beings.
31 A rationalized view of the same things would, on the other hand, mean that the 
phenomenon would be reduced to its factual existence, to what it materially is, to certain 
predicates or to the causal laws that govern its functioning. This second view seems to 
open up the possibility of a mutual understanding: we can »agree« on the things the 
bracteate is constituted. But at the same time, this view closes the factical world of the 
aristocrat who carried it, of the farmer who admired it, and of the archaeologist who 
unearthed it.
32 Rationalization, to Weber,  meant a systematization of our world-view,  a tendency to 
analyze everything in terms of unchangeable mechanistic laws. But there is a »magic« in 
every foreign system of thought, not only in religious ones, but also in chemistry and 
mathematics—different ways of thinking, new ways of existing and relating to existence. 
If there is a problem here, it is not the
33 »rationality« of those systems of explanation, but rather that their explanation always 
remains factual.  Because, when all of existence is reduced to the causal  workings of 
nature, the most important way of existing is forgotten: human'sown,  namely, their 
understanding way of being in the world, which they express above all through language 
and which ultimately separates them from plants or stones. Access to this way of existing 
is access to the magic of life, a magic we cannot afford to loose.
34 Disenchantment, then, does not simply mean that things become predictable; that the 
workings of gods and demons are replaced by the workings of mechanics. That science 
»disenchants« means that it closes off worlds of meaning, even though it harbours the 
possibility of opening them.
35 But it is not only disciplines which explicitly and because of their particular field of 
interest deal with factual explanation that tends to neglect the existential  worlds of 
meaning; the same thing also happens within the interpretive branches of science of 
religion, i.e., those branches that have human beings and their world of meaning as their 
explicit object. Eliade, for instance, in realizing the possibility of applying Otto’s concept 
of »the sacred« to the study of religious traditions and rituals from all over the world, 
even believed himself to have the foundation of a »New Humanism« within his grasp (e.g.,
ELIADE 1961). But I am at a loss to see any substantial difference between, for example, 
the interpretatio iudaeica—the Jews’ interpreting other peoples’ gods merely as forms of 
their own—and Eliade’s  search for »the sacred« as the universal  expression of homo 
religiosus. Both views  are in my eyes equally metaphysical. In both views, we are 
prevented from seeing how humans exists with their gods and see instead an ahistorical
»essence« as fundamental.
36 The post-modern criticism of the comparative method within phenomenology of religion 
has been particularly severe on this point. It has been claimed that our working across 
borders essentially leads to what has simply been called a »colonization of the Other«,11 
where »understanding« really means the forcing of the foreign into familiar structures.
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37 I would agree that the legacy of Eliade’s »humanism« was an intellectual impe- rialism 
but this was not because its explanatory model would necessarily have been less »valid«
than those of, say, structuralist anthropology or, to take a more far-fetched example, the 
principles of mathematics: we can certainly study »the sacred« in different cultures. But 
we must be aware that this ethnocentric approach closes other worlds of meaning; that it 
covers rather than dis-covers the Other in its unique historical being.
38 If humanism can be understood as an attempt to caringly preserve, to cultivate, or to 
explore the »humanity« of human beings, then a humanistic phenomenology of religion 
will not seek to understand human existeance from a given essence: for  instance,
humanitas being interpreted as the religiositas of homo religiosus. Instead, it will seek to 
uncover the structures existing within the human activity or state of »being religious«, to
reach a deeper understanding of their »religious world«, meaning a culturally specific, 
historically dependent structure of meaning ordered around phenomena we—as scholars 
in the Western tradition of »doing religion«—term »religious«.
39 In this activity, comparison is an irreplaceable tool, as in any activity involving the 
faculty of  »understanding«.  For instance,  already the very young child  develops the 
ability to tell the difference between animate and inanimate objects, which necessitates 
the ability to compare; and one of the most important conceptual activities of the human 
child already involves the process of classification (LAWSON 1996, p. 31).The ability to 
abstract, to compare, and to recognize similarity and difference between the content of 
objects and concepts belongs to the requisites for learning and using language: that is, for
acquiring meaning.
40 The role of comparison, however, need not work only as a tool to establish universal laws 
or to find the cognate in the strange: it can help us see diversity; question our traditional
categories and even, for a moment, makes us strange to ourselves, thus letting us redefine 
our existing concepts. It does not serve to find proofs for a given thesis, but instead helps 
us discover precisely those structures we could not have expected to find. Comparison in 
the post-modern study of  religion helps us open up previously overlooked worlds of 
existence.
41 The starting-point of such comparison is always and inevitably similarity: but similarity is
not identity. It is the responsibility of the scholar to determine from her/his knowledge 
of the emic sources, the language, and the cultural context whereof her/his object of 
study has been part whether the relationships hinted at by a comparative structure are 
really there also in the context of the phenomenon itself. Culturally specific knowledge 
thus remains the determining factor for the validity of her/his study and is what must 
articulate the material. But without  raising her/his eyes above the margins of this 
cultural horizon, this study may well deteriorate into factual atomism and the material, 
for all that it has to say, remains silent.
 
Summary
42 I have tried to indicate a way between the »imperialistic« tendencies of modern history of
religions and the threat of arbitrary subjectivism in the post-modern alternative, where 
»the Other« is more often than not placed on the opposite side of an unbridgeable gulf. 
Both perspectives no doubt have good intentions: the former wants to understand, the 
latter to respect. But both perspectives also harbor an alienating aspect, closing the 
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possibility of understanding between worlds of meaning in this physical world we all have
in common. My answer has been a return to the roots of hermeneutical phenomenology 
through Heidegger’s notion of factical understanding and a method of comparison that 
does  not seek to  identify causal relations  but whose aim is to reveal structures of 
meaning. My intention has certainly not been to claim that this is the best even less the 
only way of studying religious phenomena. I have only wanted to show a way in which
science could escape rationalization without rendering it »unscientific« or subjectivist: a 
way in which science can be enchanting.
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NOTES
1. A  shorter  version  of  this  article  was  originally  given  as  a  paper  at  the  13th  Students'
Symposium on the Study of Religions in Marburg on May 27th 2006.
2. Weber’s essay and his »sociology of music« are discussed by FEHER 1987.
3. 1st  edition  1933.  See  esp.  »Epilegomena«,  pp.  768–798,  which  expound  van  der  Leeuw’s
methodological-theoretical »program«.
4. Here, refers to Dilthey’s »Erlebnis eines Strukturzusammenhanges«, as well as to Usener, who
stated that, »Nur durch hingebendes Versenken in in diese Geistesspuren entschwundener Zeit,
… vermögen wir uns zum Nachempfinden zu erziehen; dann können allmählich verwandte Saiten
in uns mit schwingen und klingen, und wir entdecken im eigenen Bewußtsein die Fäden, die
Altes und Neues verbinden.« (V. D. LEEUW 19562, p. 773.)
5. E.g., the second branch of phenomenology of religion in ALLEN 20052, p. 7086, dealing simply
with »the comparative study and the classification of different types of religious phenomena.«
See  alsoGILHUS  1984,  p.  26  f.,  who  distinguishes  the  same  branch  as  the  »typological«
counterpart to the »hermeneutic« school within the comparative (phenomenological) discipline
of the history of religions.
6. So WIDENGREN 1942, who considers phenomenology of religion the synthetic and systematic
complement  to  the  analytical  studies  of  »genetic«  (homologue)  problems  within  history  of
religion, although he mentions that, at his time, this purely classificatory »complement« was
already beginning to reach the status of an independent branch.
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7. »[en] allmän, allt omspännande fenomenologisk monografi.«WIDENGREN 1942, p. 22.—For an
alternative ecological approach, see BURHENN 1997, pp. 116 ff., where the »mono- directional
theories« of Hultkrantz are contrasted with the »functional theory« employed by, among others,
Roy Rappaport.
8. See JAMES 1985. See also RYBA 1991, who ventures to find the »common semantic core« of the
actual  »phenomenologies«.  Being  of  the  opinion  that  the  importance  of  Husserl’s
phenomenology for the study of religions has been exaggerated, Ryba makes his research an
explicit  attempt to  find the extra-Husserlian roots  of  philosophical  phenomenology,  treating
scientist and philosophers such as John Robinson, Friedrich Hegel, William Whewell, and C. S.
Peirce.
9. The task is stated at p. 12. Lincoln’s comparison covers cattle breeding cultures in East Africa
and in the old Indo-Iranian area. In this way, Lincoln arrives at a point from which he is able to
»explain« how similarities in each culture could develop without ever having influenced each
other; see esp. pp. 172 ff.
10. The concept derives from Heidegger (e.g.,HEIDEGGER 196310, esp. § 38, p. 179; § 12, pp. 56 f.),
to whose thinking I owe the main thoughts of this article. However, I have preferred not to use
his philosophy more explicitly here, in part because of its complex nature, being very hard to
»use« in a context where the basic concepts are not already familiar, and in part because I make
no claim to follow it, only to be inspired by it.
11. In her article, How new is really the »new comparativism«? Difference, dialectics and world-
making,  Marsha  A.  Hewitt  simply  calls  the  »old  comparativism«  of  the  Eliadean  school  a
»colonizing practice«. (HEWITT 1996.)
ABSTRACTS
Writing dissertations, papers, or articles on a variety of religions, often foreign to us, sometimes
even extinct, we more often than not find ourselves between two opposing theoretical camps,
each  deprecating  the  other,  one  being  accused  of  »colonizing  the  Other,«  the  second  of
promoting  a  boundless  relativism.  Why  does  scientific  explanation  tend  to  »disenchant«  its
objects (Weber)? And what is the option, assuming we want to revert neither to the romantic
Nacherlebnis of Dilthey, nor to the relativism inherent in much post-modernist work? I would
like to speak about possible ways between these camps and will venture a third option, one that
tries to evade the old and influential dichotomy of (subjective) interpretation and (objective)
explanation.
Beim Verfassen von Abschlussarbeiten, Vorträgen oder Artikeln über Religionen, die uns oftmals
fremd oder sogar ausgestorben sind, finden wir uns nicht selten zwischen zwei gegensätzlichen,
sich  einander  ablehnenden  Lagern  wieder:  das  erste  ist  der  »Kolonisierung  des  Fremden«
angeklagt, das zweite wird beschuldigt, für einen grenzenlosen Relativismus zu werben. Weshalb
neigen wissenschaftliche Erklärungen dazu, ihre Objekte zu »entzaubern« (Weber)? Und worauf
würde  unsere  Wahl  fallen,  angenommen  wir  wollten  weder  in  Diltheys  romantisches
»Nacherlebnis«  noch  in den in  zahlreichen postmodernen Schriften  inheränten  Relativismus
zurückfallen?  Dieser  Artikel  bespricht  Möglichkeiten  zwischen beiden Lagern  und will  einen
dritten  Weg  wagen,  der  versucht,  die  alte  und  einflussreiche  Dichotomie  der  (subjektiven)
Interpretation und (objektiven) Erklärung zu umgehen.
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